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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Erwin ChemerInsky*
Honorable George C. Pratt:
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky is one of the leading scholars on
constitutional law. We are delighted to have you here. Erwin,
you have the floor.
Professor Erwin Chemeinsky:
There is no concept in American law that is more elusive or
more controversial than substantive due process. Substantive due
process has been used in this century to protect some of our most
precious liberties. Still, there are now and have always been
Justices of the Supreme Court who believe there is no such thing
as substantive due process.
During my time this morning, I would like to address four
questions. First, what is substantive due process? Second, what
is the history of substantive due process? Third, when does
substantive due process apply and fourth, what are the elements
of a substantive due process claim?
I start briefly with the first question, what is substantive due
process, because, strangely enough, if you look through Supreme
Couit opinions you will never find a definition. Substantive due
process asks the question of whether the government's
deprivation of a person's life, liberty or property is justified by a
sufficient purpose. Procedural due process, by contrast, asks
whether the government has followed the proper procedures when
it takes away life, liberty or property. Substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient substantive justification, a
good enough reason for such a deprivation.
Consider this simple illustration. The Supreme Court has said
that under the word liberty in the due process clause, parents
have a fundamental right to the custody of their children.'
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of
Southern California Law School. This article is based on a transcript of
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Procedural due process means that the government must give
notice and a hearing before it can permanently terminate custody.
Substantive means the government must show a compelling
reason that would demonstrate an adequate justification for
terminating custody.
With this definition in mind, I want to address, briefly, the
second question - what is the history of substantive due process?
The reality is if you are a plaintiff in court and you are asserting
a substantive due process claim, you have an uphill battle. Why?
The answer is historical.
Substantive due process was used, as you know, in the first
third of this century to aggressively protect economic liberties
from government interference. Lochner v. New York' is the
quintessential case from that era. In Lochner, the Supreme Court
remarks given at the Practicing Law Institute program on the Supreme Court,
November, 1998. I am grateful to Patricia Rooney for all her hard work in
preparing this article for publication.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). In Santosky, the
Supreme Court explained that a parent's "fundamental liberty interest" with
regard to the "care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State." Id. The Court stated:
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain
a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of
their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need
for procedural protections than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
Id. at 753-54.
2 Id. at 758-59 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981) (stating that a "parent's 'desire for and right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an
interest far more precious than any property right.") (internal quotation
citation omitted).
' Id. at 762 (noting "[p]ermanent neglect proceedings employ imprecise
substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective
values of the judge.").
' 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
2
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struck down a New York law that limited the maximum number
of hours that bakers could work.' The Supreme Court held, to
use modem language, that freedom of contract was a fundamental
right under the liberty of the due process clause and used strict
scrutiny to evaluate this law.
In the first third of this century, until 1937, over two hundred
laws were struck down for economic regulations., Since 1937,
the Court has repudiated economic substantive due process.' In
5 Id. at 58 (holding that "the limit of the police power has been reached
and passed in this case," as there is "no reasonable foundation for holding this
[law] to be necessary.. to safeguard the public health, or the health of the
individuals who are following the trade of a baker."). The New York statute
in Lochner prevented an employee from "work[ing] in a biscuit, bread or cake
bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week,
or more than ten hours in any one day." Id. at 45 n.1. The purported purpose
of this law was to protect the health of the bakers. Id. at 59. The Court made
note of the fact that the "trade of a baker," has never been "regarded as an
unhealthy [trade]," certainly not "unhealthy" enough to allow "the legislature
to supervise and control the hours" the bakers worked. Id.
6 Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)
(noting that "[t]he general right to make a contract... is part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the [Fourteenth] Amendment")).
' Id. (noting that such regulation would be permissible only if it "relate[d]
to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.").
8 ERWiN CHFEMmuNSKY, CONSTrruTiONAL LAW PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
482 (1997) (citing BENJArMIN WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMmICAN
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw 154 (1942) (further citations omitted) (noting that from
1905-1937 "almost 200 state laws were declared unconstitutional [in violation
of] the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")).
9 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In
Parrish, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected Lochner's principles. Id. at
391. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, explained that:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.
It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation liberty
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation,
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is
liberty in a social organization which requires the protection
of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the people. iberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due
3
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fact, since 1937, not one federal, state, or local economic
regulation has been invalidated on substantive due process
grounds. This is important to keep in mind for a case that we just
spoke of a few minutes ago, Gabbert v. Conn,"° where the Ninth
Circuit found a substantive due process right for lawyers to
practice their profession." Gabbert is inconsistent with all of the
process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is
due process.
Id. at 391; see also United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938). In Caroline, the Court articulated its newfound policy of judicial
deference to economic regulations stating:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory regulations
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as
to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
Id. at 152. In footnote four, the Court made certain to note that the
rational basis review would not be the test for all laws stating:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth. (citations omitted). It is unnecessary to consider
now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . Nor need we
inquire... whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operations of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152-53 n.4.
10 131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 119 S. Ct. 39 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1998) (No. 97-1802).
" Id. at 800 (finding the Fourteenth Amendment "protects an individual's
right to practice a profession"). The Ninth Circuit specifically found that
4
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Supreme Court's economic due process cases from 1937 on. In
the first third of the century, the Court did not use substantive
due process only in the economic area, it also used it to protect
civil liberties 2 and these cases continue to this day.
In Meyer v. Nebraska," the Plaintiff claimed that, under the
liberty of the due process clause, parents have a fundamental
right to control the upbringing of their children.'4 In Meyer, the
Supreme Court declared a Nebraska law that prohibited the
teaching of the German language unconstitutional."s The Court
did not attack the law on First Amendment grounds, because the
First Amendment had yet to be incorporated by the Fourteenth
Gabbert was entitled to practice his profession "in privacy," free "from
unreasonable intrusion" by the government. Id. at 802.
12 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 630 (1925) (stating "freedom
of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
13 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'4 Id. at 399. The Meyer Court noted that liberty:
[D]enotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
Id. at 398 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872)).
"s Id. at 403 (holding "the statute as applied is arbitrary and without
reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state.").
Justice Reynolds, writing for the Court, explained:
[Tihe state may do much . . . in order to improve the
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally...
but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must
be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to
all, to those who speak other languages as well as those born
with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary
speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict
with the Constitution - a desirable and [sic] cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.
Id. at 401.
5
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Amendment and thus was not yet applied to the states.'6 The
court did so expressly on substantive due process grounds."'
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,8 the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an Oregon law that prohibited parochial school
education. 9 Once again, the Court did not do so on First
Amendment grounds since the Free Exercise Clause had not yet
been applied to the states. The Court did so on substantive due
process grounds,2 and yet, after 1937, the Court backed away
from substantive due process in all of its forms, economic and
otherwise.
The best illustration of the avoidance of substantive due
process is Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut."' Griswold declared unconstitutional a Connecticut
law that prohibited the sale, distribution, and use of
contraceptives.' Justice Douglas, at the beginning of the
majority opinion stated:
16 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (holding the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of
Rights against the States).
17 Meyer, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
,8 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19 Id. at 535. The Court noted that:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this union repose excludes any general power
of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for his additional obligations.
Id.
' Pierce, 258 U.S. at 535 (explaining "rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the state.").
2' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' Id. at 485. The statute stated in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who
uses any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing
contraception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." Id.
at 480 (further citation quotation omitted). The Court held that this "law
[could] not stand" since a "'governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means
6
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Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. State of
New York... should be our guide. But we decline that
invitation as we did in [other cases] .... We do not sit as a
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions. This law however, operates
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their
physician's role in one aspect of that relation.'
Douglas then proceeded to find privacy in the "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights.2
One commentator' said Douglas was like a cheerleader
skipping through the Bill of Rights saying - give me a "P," give
me an "R," give me an "I," ultimately all the way to "privacy"
which swing unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.'" Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
Justice Douglas stated that the idea of allowing "the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives... is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship." Id. at 485-86.
' Id. at 481-82. Justice Douglas noted that the Court was faced with "a
wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment" since certain arguments before the Court suggest the
application of Lochner v. State of New York. Id. See also Lincoln Fed.
Labor Union v. Northwest Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949)
(explaining the "due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that
the Congress and state legislators are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to
suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as injurious to
the public welfare."); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (noting "[tihe day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause
... to strike down... laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought"); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (stating
we abandon "the use of the vague contours of the Due Process Clause to
nullify laws which a majority of the Court believe[ ] to be economically
unwise.").
24 Id. at 484. Justice Douglas most eloquently stated that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by the emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. (internal citation
omitted). Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Id.
's See Robert G. Dixon, The New Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 84.
1999 1507
7
Chemerinsky: Substantive Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
TOURO LAWREVJEW
under the Bill of Rights.' I think some of the questionable
foundation concerning the protection of privacy stems from the
way in which Douglas found privacy to protect privacy.
How, was the Bill of Rights applied to state and local
governments? Through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Douglas used substantive due process even
though at the time he denied that was what he was doing.21
Eight years later in Roe v. Wade,2 the Supreme Court
expressly declared that the right to privacy is safeguarded through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth and Ninth
Amendments.' Roe was unquestionably a substantive due
process case.' The controversy surrounding Roe really illustrates
just how controversial substantive due process is as a concept.
With this history in mind, I will spend most of my time on the
third question --when is substantive due process used? When is it
available to you as lawyers? The reality is that substantive due
process can be used any time the government takes away life,
liberty or property.
26 Id.
27 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82. Justice Douglas stated:
Coming to the merits [of the issue in Griswold], we are met
with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some
arguments suggest that Lochner v. State of New York,
(citation omitted), should be our guide. But we decline that
invitation as we did in [other cases].
Id.
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
' Id. at 153. Justice Blackmun explained that the "right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action or . . . in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
30 Id. at 164 (holding a statute "that excepts from criminality only a life-
saving procedure on behalf of the mother without regard to her pregnancy
stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
1508 [Vol 15
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Any time the government deprives a person of life, liberty or
property, the government must provide a sufficient justification."
So, for example, a couple of years ago, in a case called BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,32 the United States Supreme Court
said that excessive punitive damages violate the due process
clause." It was very much a substantive due process decision, for
the Court was saying that the government was taking away
property without an excuse and for that they had to have
sufficient justification.Y
There are two main areas where courts use substantive due
process. The first is in the protection of unenumerated
constitutional rights. The origin of this is the Lochner-, era
substantive due process decisions. Lochner proclaimed freedom
of contract to be a fundamental right under the due process
clause.'3 Meyer' and Pierce" proclaimed the right to control the
upbringing of children to be a fundamental right."
31 See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 353 (1986); Sacramento
v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1996) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (noting "'[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of
the individual against the arbitrary action of government.'"); see also Fockaert
v. Humboldt, No. C-98-2662, 1999 WL 30537, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
1999).
32 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In BMW, the Court explained that "[o]nly when
an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to" the
"[State's] legitimate interests in punishing [the Defendant] and deterring it
from future misconduct," does the award "enter the zone of arbitrariness that
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 568.
" Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (further citation omitted) (explaining the "Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a grossly
excessive punishment on a tortfeasor.").
' Id. at 588 (explaining the Alabama statute imposing punitive damages
defined the offending conduct in rather broad terms, thus making far more
actions subject to its prohibitions than otherwise might first be expected).
5 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
I6 d. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 579 (1897). See
also supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. The Pierce
Court noted :
9
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So courts have continued throughout the century, even with
substantive due process being discredited, to use substantive due
process to safeguard rights that are not otherwise enumerated in
the constitution. ' ° Gabbert v. Conn' a case now pending before
the Supreme Court, is a Ninth Circuit decision saying lawyers
have a right to practice their profession even though that right is
nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. '2
It is important to take a moment to look at those areas where
the Court has found rights under substantive due process and also
to look at the more recent cases that reject such protection. For
example, the Supreme Court has expressly said that the right to
marry is a fundamental right protected under the liberty of the
due process clause 3 and that in order to show a substantive
justification that is adequate, the government must meet strict
scrutiny."4 Zablocki v. Redhail is illustrative.
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id.
'0 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also
supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
41 131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997).
42 Id. at 801-02 (citing Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the "Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual's right to
practice a profession," and this "constitutional right may be clearly established
both by common law and by precedent.").
43 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a Virginia
statute prohibiting persons of the white race from intermarrying noting "tihe
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the ordinary pursuit of happiness by free men.").
" Id. at 11. Chief Justice Warren noted that racial classifications:
[M]ust be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court
have already stated that they 'cannot conceive of a valid
10
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Wisconsin had a law that said before a parent with minor
children not in their custody could get a marriage license, the
parent had to prove that all support payments were up to date."
The Court relied on substantive due process since the right to
marry is a fundamental right under the liberty of the due process
clause.'7 The Court said to show an adequate justification, the
government must meet strict scrutiny and that it had failed to do
so.48
Another example is the right to custody of one's children. The
Supreme Court has, in many cases, proclaimed the importance of
the right to custody. In 1973, in Stanley v. Illinois,8 the Supreme
Court said that unmarried fathers have a right to custody of their
children.-"
Stanley v. Illinois involved an Illinois law that said that if an
unmarried mother was no longer able to have custody, if, for
example, she put the children up for adoption or she died, then
the children automatically would be put up for adoption." In
legislative purpose... which makes the color of a person's
skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.'
Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
4' 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
I id. at 375 (further citation omitted) (stating the marriage applicant also
had to "demonstrate that the children covered by the support order" were not
now, or "likely thereafter to become public charges").
47 Id. at 384 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(noting that "the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy'
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause").
's Id. at 386 (noting that although not every statute "which relates in any
way to the incidents or prerequisites for marriage must be subject to rigorous
scrutiny," this statute "clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the
right to marry").
49 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
"0 Id. at 646-47 (citing In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815-16 (11. 1970)).
51 Id. at 646 (noting that the Illinois statute in issue provided that "children
of unwed fathers [would] become wards of the State upon the death of [their]
mother.").
1999 1511
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Stanley, the Illinois Supreme Court said that the unmarried father
had no rights at all."
The United States Supreme Court declared this
unconstitutional. 3  They said that unmarried fathers, like
mothers, have a fundamental right to custody of their children
and the government is going to be able to terminate that only by
meeting the heightened proof of requirement.m
With regard to substantive due process, and specifically with
the right to custody, Michael H. v. Gerald D.11 was an extremely
important decision. Michael H. had facts that a made for TV
movie could be made from.
A married woman had a child resulting from an affair. 6
Biological evidence showed that the father was not her husband,
but the man she had the affair with.- She did not divorce her
husband, but moved in with the biological father and they lived
together for almost eighteen months. 8 She then rejoined her
husband Gerald, 59 and Michael, the biological father sued for
visitation rights. 61 California law, however, provided that if a
52 Id. at 646-47 (noting the highest court in Illinois has rejected the claim
that the unmarried father "could properly be separated from his children"
simply because he had not been married to their now deceased mother).
5' Id. at 657-58 (explaining that the Due Process Clause mandates that the
States interest here is "not sufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when
the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.").
m Id. at 656-57. The Court explained that it would always be cheaper and
easier to make parental fitness determinations by "presumptions" as opposed to
"individualized determination." Id. The Court held that when "procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care . . . it needlessly
risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child"
and as such, it "cannot stand." Id. at 657.
s 491 U.S. 110 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (Aug. 30, 1989).
56 Id. at 113-14.
57 Id. at 114.
58 Id. at 114-15.
'9 Id. at 115.
60 Id.
1512 [Vol 15
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married woman had a child, there was an irrebuttable
presumption that the husband was the father of the child.6'
The California court used this law to deny the biological father
all visitation rights, all parental rights.- The United States
Supreme Court in a 5 to 4 decision upheld the California law in
its application and ruled against the biological father." Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion that was in part for the majority and in
part for the plurality. The majority opinion said there is no
tradition of protecting a biological father's rights when the
mother is married to someone else.61
Justice Scalia noted that all of the cases about an unmarried
father's rights never dealt with children resulting from an affair.61
Then, in a part of the opinion that was only for the plurality,
Justice Scalia stated that when the Court considers whether to
create rights under substantive due process, such rights should be
established only if there is a tradition of protecting them, with the
tradition stated at the most specific level of abstraction.' In other
words, it is not enough to show a tradition protecting a father's,
even underrated father's, rights.
Justice Scalia said that in order to protect a right under
substantive due process, that right has to be traditionally
protected when stated at the most specific level of abstraction.6
It has to be a tradition of protecting the unmarried father's rights
61 Id. (further citation omitted) (stating "the issue of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is neither impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be
a child of the marriage.").
62 Id. at 116 (citing 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1013 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)).
The California Court explained that "court-ordered visitation would ba
detrimental to the best interests of the child." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 1013.
6 491 U.S. at 130.
Id. at 124 (further citation omitted) (noting "[t]he presumption of
legitimacy was a fundamental principle of the common law.").
's Id. at 125 (stating "[w]e have found nothing in the older sources nor in
the older cases, addressing . . . the power of the natural father to assert
parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another
man.").
6 Id. at 127 n.6.
6id.
1999 1513
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when the mother is married to someone else.' This way of
defining liberty interests shows that virtually no rights were
protected under substantive due process, because if a right was
already protected, there would be no reason to have the Court do
it. The fact the right is not protected shows there is no tradition
of protecting the right stated at the most specific level of
abstraction. The plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.
shows there are several Justices on the Court who are likely to
reject any substantive due process claim.
A third example, in another particularly important case with
regard to substantive due process, is Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.' In Moore, there was an East Cleveland zoning
ordinance that limited the number of unrelated individuals who
could share a home.7 A grandmother and her two grandchildren,
who happened to be first cousins, were prevented from living
together because of the way "unrelated" was defined by the
ordinance."
The United States Supreme Court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional. 7  Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
expressly relied on substantive due process.? He especially
6 id.
69 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
" Id. at 496. The definitional section of the zoning ordinance in Moore
provided that a family could not include "more than one dependent married or
unmarried child of the nominal head of the household or the spouse of the
nominal head of the household and the spouse and dependent children of such
dependent child." Id. n.2 (further citation omitted).
71 Id. (further citation omitted) (stating that "family means a number of
individuals related to the nominal head of the household or to the spouse of the
nominal head of the household living as a single housekeeping unit in a single
dwelling unit."); see also supra note 76.
72 Id. at 506 (holding the "Constitution prevents East Cleveland from
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns.").
73 Id. at 499-501. Justice Powell explained that unless the Court "close[s]
[its] eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family
have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, [the Court] cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these
precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Id. at 501. Justice
Powell continued, stating that "[s]ubstantive due process has at times been a
1514 [Vol 15
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depended on an earlier opinion by Justice Harlan written as a
dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 4
In Poe, Harlan said that although substantive due process has
been discredited, it still remains and courts can protect under
such rights so long as there is a tradition of such protection.7-
Justice Powell used that reasoning in Moore to find the right to
keep the family together.7 If you are a plaintiff's lawyer, you
want to rely on Moore if you are trying to use substantive due
process to create a new unenumerated right.
A fourth example where the courts used substantive due
process is the right to abortion. Roe v. Wade" was unequivocally
treacherous field for this Court. Id. at 502. He explained that "[t]here are
risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive
liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights." Id. He noted that although "history counsels caution and
restraint,. . . it does not counsel abandonment, nor does it require what the
city urges here: cutting off any protection of family rights at the first
convenient, if arbitrary boundary - the boundary of the nuclear family." Id.
74 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Is d. at 542 (Harlan, J. dissenting). Justice Harlan most eloquently stated:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula ....
Through the course of this Court's decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional
concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly
has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which
I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to
what history teaches are the traditions from which it
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which
radically departs from it could not long survive, while a
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area
for judgment and restraint.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-503 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542
(Harlan, J. dissenting)).
7' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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a substantive due process decision.' The most recent case,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, I decided in 1992, reaffirms Roe v.
Wade. ' Although the Court, for the first time, found abortion
rights under equal protection,8' Casey is still very much
substantive due process.' All of those examples involve rights
safeguarded under substantive due process.
In contrast, consider two other examples that point in the
opposite direction. One of course is Bowers v. Hardwick,' a
1986 decision. Bowers was a challenge to a Georgia law that
prohibited oral-genital or anal-genital contact.' It was brought by
7 Id. at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart noted, in his
concurrence, that although Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)
"purport[s] to sound the death knell for the doctrine of substantive due
process," it is clear that the decision in Griswold "can be rationally understood
only as a holding that the ... statute substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
167-68 (internal quotation omitted).
79 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
so Id. at 846 (stating "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be
retained and once again reaffirmed.").
81 Id. at 849-52. In Casey, the Court explained:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we
suppose some shall always disagree, about the profound
moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy,
even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality,
but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.
The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can
resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way
that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in
those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a
danger to her own health, or is the result of rape or incest.
Id. at 850-51.
' Id. at 849-51 (explaining that the "boundaries" of substantive due
process "are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule," since the
Constitution recognizes such choices as deciding "whether to bear or beget a
child" as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.).
83 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8' Id. at 188 n.1 (further citation omitted) (stating that sodomy is
committed when a person "performs or submits to any sexual act involving the
sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another").
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 4, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/15
SUBSTANTIVE D UE PROCESS
a gay man who argued the state did not have the ability or
authority to regulate the behavior of consenting adults in the
privacy of their own bedrooms.' I would certainly think if the
right to privacy means anything, it applies to the behavior of
consenting adults in their own bedrooms, but the Supreme Court,
in a 5 to 4 decision, upheld the application of the Georgia law to
private consensual homosexual activities.,
Justice White's majority opinion is important in substantive due
process litigation. Justice White states rights should be protected
under substantive due process only if they are enumerated in the
text, clearly intended by the framers, or there is a tradition of
protecting such rights.Y
Justice White then surveyed the history of our country and
noted that, throughout much of American history, there have
been laws that prohibit private consensual homosexuality.' For
example, up until 1961, all fifty states outlawed private
homosexual activity, 9 Justice White concluded that the Court
should be reluctant to recognize unenumerated substantive due
process, recognizing such rights only if there is an unequivocal
' Id. at 195. The plaintiff, in Bowers, relied on Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), to assert the claim that homosexual conduct should be
protected when it occurs "'in the privacy of the home.'" Id. (citing Stanley,
394 U.S. at 565). The Court, in Stanley, an obscenity case, held that "[i]f the
First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling
a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
6 Id. at 196. The Court noted that the Georgia law was "based on notions
of morality," and explained that "if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts [would]
be very busy indeed." Id. The Court stated that, although the respondent
"insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be
declared inadequate," the Court was not persuaded "that the sodomy laws of
some 25 States should be invalidated" for this reason. Id.
' Id. at 194 (noting "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.").
' Id. at 192 (explaining "[piroscriptions against [homosexual] conduct
have ancient roots.").
" Id. at 193 n.7.
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tradition for their protection.' Since there is not such a right in
Bowers, it is very difficult to persuade the Court that other such
rights should exist and this idea has been affirmned in recent
Supreme Court cases."'
The sixth example I want to talk about is the right to refuse
medical care and the right to physician assisted suicide. In 1990,
in Cruzan v. Director Missouri Department of Health,' the
Supreme Court held that competent adults have the right to refuse
even lifesaving medical care.' Of eight of the nine Justices then
sitting on the Court,94 all but Justice Scalia recognized that
competent adults have the right, under the word "liberty" of the
due process clause, to terminate food, water, or other medical
care.
95
90 Id. at 194 (explaining that "[a]gainst this background, to claim that a
right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious.").
91 See, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992) (holding
"the Due Process Clause does not impose an independent federal obligation
upon municipalities to provide certain minimal levels of safety and security in
the workplace"); see also Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985). In Ewing, Justice Stevens explained:
'[A]lthough the Court regularly proceeds on the
assumption that the Due Process Clause has more than a
procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that the
substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its
language nor by preconstitutional history; that content is
nothing more than the accumulated product of judicial
interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
[The Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it
thinks merely arbitrary or unreasonable.'
Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543-44
(1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
92 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
93 Id. at 279 (noting "for purposes of this case, we assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
94 The eight Justices referred to by the author are Justices Rehnquist,
White, O'Connor, Kennedy, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 263-64.
95 Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining "I would have preferred
that we announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no
18
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The majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist is particularly
striking for it did not adopt or articulate a level of scrutiny. The
Court stated that there was a liberty interest in refusing medical
care," but never said that such an interest would trigger strict
scrutiny or, for that matter, any form of heightened scrutiny.
The Supreme Court turned to related questions just a year ago
when it resolved the issue of whether there is a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. In that term, the Court had
two cases before it concerning this issue, Washington v.
Glucksberg' and Vacco v. Quill."
Washington v. Glucksberg was a substantive due process case.
Glucksberg was a challenge by terminally ill patients to a
Washington law that prohibited aiding or abetting suicide." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that just
as individuals have a right to abortion and to terminate medical
care, so do they have a liberty interest in physician-assisted
suicide." Justice Reinhardt, writing for the Ninth Circuit, said
that strict scrutiny was to be applied and that the Washington law
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide failed strict scrutiny.''
Vacco v. Quill 0 was a Second Circuit case that was an equal
protection challenge to a New York law prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide. The United States Court of Appeals for the
business in this field; that American law has always accorded the State the
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide - including suicide by refusing
to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life.").
' Id. at 278 (stating "[tihe principal that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
97 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
9 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
o Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en bane), rev'd sub nom, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997) (explaining "the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty
interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death - that there is, in
short, a constitutionally recognized 'right to die.'").
101 Id. at 838 (holding that "a liberty interest exists in the choice of how and
when one dies.").
'02 80 F.3d 716, 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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Second Circuit held that prohibiting physician-assisted suicide
denied equal protection."° The court noted that those who are
using artificial life-support devices, such as respirators, already
have the right to physician-assisted suicide, because under
Cruzan, °'0 they can order that the devices be terminated."5 The
court further noted that those who are not on artificial life-support
devices are discriminated against and are denied physician-
assisted suicide. 10
The Supreme Court reversed both the Ninth Circuit and the
Second Circuit in unanimous decisions'07-- not a single Justice
found a constitutional right to physician assisted-suicide. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in both cases.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist said
courts should protect rights under the liberty of the due process
clause only if they are enumerated in the text, intended by the
framers or there is a clear tradition of safeguarding such a
right."°  Rehnquist noted that forty-nine of the fifty states have
laws that prohibit physician-assisted suicide, and thus concluded
that there is no such right.1°9
103 Id. at 719 (explaining "[t]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who
are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the
removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for the
previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten
death by self-administering the prescribed drugs.").
"o Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See
supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
'0s Vacco, 80 F.3d at 728-29 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79)
(explaining "'[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred'" from prior Supreme Court decisions, and thus such a "person [has]
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.").
106 Id. at 729 (quoting Vacco, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(explaining that the New York statute at issue treats terminally ill patients who
are on life-support systems differently than those who are not thus creating a
"difference between allowing nature to take its course .. .and intentionally
using an artificial death-producing device.").
'o Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275
(1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997).
'0o Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263-67.
109 Id. at 2266, 2271.
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In Vacco v. Qitll,"0 Justice Rehnquist, writing once again for
the majority, held that under equal protection analysis, heightened
scrutiny is used only if a suspect class is discriminated against or
if discrimination acts to deny a fundamental right."' If the
represented party is merely denied some other right, rational
basis review applies and the government wins.112
Four Justices concurred in the judgment and left open the
possibility of an "as applied" challenge."' Justice Breyer, in his
concurrence, noted that the state has no interest in prolonging
suffering."1 ' Should a person show an inability to get pain
medication to work adequately, then there is a possibility of an
"as applied" challenge.M
However, all nine Justices objected to the facial challenge and
rejected the substantive due process claim.16 The reason I stress
this is I think that vwhen you read Bowers v. Hardwick"7 and
Washington v. Glucksberg"8 together, it becomes extremely
difficult for plaintiffs to persuade courts to recognize any
"o Vacco, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
"I Id. at 2297 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (noting
"ilf a legislative classification or distinction 'neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears rational
relation to some legitimate end.'").
112 Id. at 2297-2298.
1 Id. at 2312 (Breyer, I., concurring) (noting "were state law to prevent
the position of palliative care, including administration of drugs as needed to
avoid pain at the end of life - then the law's impact upon serious and otherwise
unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more directly at
issue.").
"' Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining the state laws before the
Court "do not force a dying person to undergo [severe physical] pain.").
1-5 Id. at 2312 (Breyer, ., concurring) (noting that if the laws were
different "the Court might have to revisit its conclusion[ ]").
116 Id. at 2275. The Court held that the Washington statute at issue "does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or 'as applied to
competent terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors.'" Id. (quoting Compassion in Dying
v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane)).
117 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See also supra notes 83-90 and accompanying
text.
11 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). See also supra
notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
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additional unenumerated rights, given the importance of the
interests involved in those cases and the fact that they were not
recognized.
There is a second line of cases where the Supreme Court has
considered and used substantive due process. This concerns
challenges to police behavior. Recall my initial definition of
substantive due process -- when the govermuent deprives a person
of life, liberty or property, is its actions justified by adequate
reason.119  This means that if the government takes away
somebody's liberty in an arbitrary or capricious manner, it is a
violation of substantive due process.
In Rochin v. California, the Court said that since police
officers are obviously government officials, their actions too are
limited by substantive due process.12  In Rochin, the police
forcibly pumped a person's stomach to recover drugs.Iu The
United States Supreme Court held that the police's action shocked
the conscious and therefore it violated substantive due process."'
119 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
"0 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
12' Id. at 174.
=z Id. at 166. In Rochin, the defendant, a suspected narcotics dealer,
swallowed several capsules to prevent the police from examining the capsules
to determine whether they were narcotics. Id. The police officers then took
the suspect to the hospital where a "doctor forced an emetic solution through a
tube into (the defendant's] stomach against his will." Id. This so-called
"stomach pumping" forced the defendant to vomit. Id. A subsequent drug
analysis revealed that the capsules contained morphine. Id.
3 Id. at 172. The Court stated that the police officers conduct was
"conduct that shock[ed] the conscience. Id. The Court went on to note:
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the [defendant], the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents - this course of
proceeding by agents of the government to obtain evidence is
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation.
1522 [Vol 15
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It was an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and thus a denial of due
process. '2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
an opinion by Judge Friendly, in Johnson v. Glick,'2 held that the
excessive use of force is a denial of due process if the police's
behavior shocks the conscious.'2 Circuits all over the country
cited to and copied the Friendly opinion in Johnson v. Glick.'"
The "shocks the conscious test" became the controlling standard
in excessive force cases, at least until 1989,11 and was very much
a substantive due process notion. What Judge Friendly is saying
is when the police are using excessive force so as to "shock the
conscious," they are depriving people of their liberty in an
arbitrary and capricious manner thus violating due process. '2
However, in 1989, in Graham v. Connor,'" the Supreme Court
rejected the "shocks the conscious test" with regard to excessive
police force."' The Supreme Court held that excessive force
cases against police officers must be brought under the Fourth
1' Id. at 173 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)
(holding "[d]ue process of law, as a historic and generative principle,
precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more
precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that
offend 'a sense ofjustice.'").
"l 481 F.2d 1028 (1973), rev'd sub noma, Employee-Officer John v.
Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
'2 Id. at 1033 (stating that although the shocks the conscience test used in
Rochin "is not one that can be applied by a computer, it at least points the
way.").
' 7 See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment, Rethinking Ecessive Force, 1987
DUKE L. J. 692, 694-96 nn. 16-23 (explaining "[t]he circuits excessive force
standard originated in the 1973 Second Circuit decision in Johnson v. Glick").
8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
"G Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032.
"0 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
131 Id. at 393 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)
(stating "we reject this notion that all excessive force claims brought under §
1983 are governed by a single generic standard," since "§ 1983 is not a source
of substantive rights," but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.'").
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Amendment' 32 and not under due process. 33 I think this case is
indicative of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to substantive due
process indicated by an unwillingness to use the due process
clause as the basis for police claims, instead turning to the Fourth
Amendment, another constitutional provision.
In 1994, in Albright v. Oliver,'3 the Supreme Court considered
whether police could be sued for malicious arrest and prosecution
under substantive due process. 35 In a plurality opinion, four
Justices rejected substantive due process noting that malicious
arrest cases must be brought under the Fourth Amendment. 36
It is in this context that Sacramento v. Lewis 7 becomes
important. Professor Schwartz provided an excellent recitation of
the facts of Sacramento v. Lewis' and although I am not going to
repeat what he covered, I do want to highlight additional points
concerning the case.
The first point is that the Court did not reject substantive due
process. The Court held that there is a substantive due process
claim available with regard to high speed chases, 139 although the
132 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent
part, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ." Id.
'13 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 (holding that petitioner's claim against law
enforcement officials alleging the excessive use of force during an
investigatory stop is "properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment [.
rather than under [ ] substantive due process").
'4 510 U.S. 266 (1994), reh'g denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994).
13- Id. at 268 (noting "[p]etitioner asks us to recognize a substantive right
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from
criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.").
136 Id. at 271 (holding "it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due
process, under which petitioner Albright's claim must be judged").
117 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
138 See Schwartz, supra.
131 Sacramento, 118 S. Ct. at 1715. Justice Souter stated that the Court was
"presented . . . with the threshold issue . . . [of] whether facts involving a
police chase aimed at apprehending suspects can ever support a due process
claim." Id. at 1714-15. Justice Souter continued explaining that "substantive
due process analysis" is appropriate in the present case. Id. at 1715.
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Court, as Professor Schwartz pointed out,'1 sets a standard that is
almost impossible to meet. Here is why I think that this is
important.
In Sacramento v. Lewis, had the Court followed Graham v.
Connor44 and Albright v. Oliver4 and said you can not bring a
substantive due process claim, you must bring your claim under
the Fourth Amendment, there would have been no constitutional
claim at all. In California v. Hodari D.,'" the United States
Supreme Court said a chase is not a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.'" So if there had been a Fourth
Amendment claim in Sacramento v. Lewis, nothing would have
come of it as a constitutional matter.
As a matter of fact, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,
concurring in the judgment, took exactly that position.'" Justice
Scalia said there is no such thing as substantive due process so the
claim should either be brought under other constitutional
provisions or brought in State Court."
14 See Schwartz, supra.
14' 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
142 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
'4 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
'44Id. at 626. The Court stated that "[t]he language of the Fourth
Amendment... cannot sustain respondent's contention" explaining that "[t]he
word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application
of physical force to restrain movement," and therefore the word cannot
possibly encompass the situation where a "policeman yell[s] 'Stop, in the name
of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee." Id.
Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1723 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.,
concurring).
" Id. at 1725 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, in
his concurrence, stated that "[t]o hold . . . that all government conduct
deliberately indifferent to life, liberty, or property, violates the Due Process
Clause would make the 'the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States.'" Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (further
citation omitted)). Justice Scalia continued, noting that "'[o]ur Constitution
deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does
not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to
regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society.'" Id.
(quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332). Justice Scalia emphatically stated that the
Court has held, on many occasions, that "'the Due Process Clause of the
25
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Justice Souter, writing for the majority, did however,
recognize substantive due process as a viable claim. 0 Justice
Souter held that the requirement for substantive due process is
"shocks the conscious,"" which requires showing that the law
enforcement personnel had the purpose of causing harm. 49 This
is a very difficult standard to meet, but it does preserve
substantive due process, perhaps in other areas.
The only other thing I want to add to what Professor Schwartz
said about Sacramento v. Lewis, is that the Court draws a
distinction between situations where government officers have a
chance to deliberate and reflect as opposed to emergency
situations. 11
The Supreme Court has held that government negligence is
insufficient for a claim under the due process clause. "I The
question then becomes what exactly is enough and the Supreme
Court has never answered that directly, but I think Sacramento v.
Lewis shows what the majority of the Court thinks.
Justice Souter says emergency situations have to be
distinguished from non-emergency situations.' In emergency
situations, like high-speed chases, there is no opportunity for
deliberation, so deliberate indifference is an inappropriate
Fourteenth Amendment... does not transform every tort committed by a state
actor into a constitutional violation.'" Id. (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)).
'47 Id. at 1715.
'4 Sacramento, 118 S. Ct at 1717 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 128 (1992)) (stating "the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause is violated by executive action only when it 'can properly be
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense."').
"49 Id. at 1720 (holding that "high-speed chases with intent to harm suspects
physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the
Fourteenth Amendment").
'5 Id. at 1720 (distinguishing situations where public officers have the
"time to make unhurried judgments" from situations where "unforeseen
circumstances demand an officer's instant judgment").
'51 Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (noting "the protections
of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not
triggered by lack of due care").
152 Sacramento, 118 S. Ct. at 1720.
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standard.13 Thus, the Court chooses the "shocks the conscious"
standard. However, by implication, in other situations where
there is the opportunity for deliberation and reflection, deliberate
indifference should be enough for substantive due process
violation. Thus, Sacramento v. Lewis offers plaintiffs an
additional tool in lower courts clarifying when due process claims
are available.
Let me then turn to a fourth and final question. What are the
elements of a substantive due process claim? I suggest to you
that there are three elements that must be met. First, there must
be a deprivation, second, it must be of life, liberty or property,
and third, it must be shown that the government did not have an
adequate justification for its action.' s If the plaintiff can show a
deprivation of life, liberty or property without an adequate
justification, the plaintiff has then set out a substantive due
process claim.
There are a couple of contexts in which the Supreme Court has
had to consider what is a deprivation. One context has been
whether or not a negligent government action is sufficient for a
deprivation. The 1986 case of Daniels v. Wliams'"5 and its
companion case Davidson v. Cannon' are the leading decisions
in this area.
153 Id.
'-4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court set
forth three factors that must be considered in a due process analysis. Id. at
334. The Court explained:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interests that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used; and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
'-s 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
5s 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
1999 1527
27
Chemerinsky: Substantive Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
1528 TOURO LAWREVIEW [Vol 15
Daniels involved a prisoner who slipped on a pillow that was
negligently left on a prison step.' The prisoner sued the prison
saying that its negligence cost him his liberty, his bodily safety
without due process."" The companion case, Davidson v.
Cannon,'59 involved a prison inmate who was threatened by
another and informed the warden.'1 The warden did nothing and
the prisoner was attacked and suffered serious injuries.' The
prisoner sued saying the warden's negligence cost him his liberty,
his bodily safety without due process.6 2
In both of the these cases, the Supreme Court said that
government negligence is not enough for deprivation under the
due process clause's leaving open the question of what is enough.
Certainly, intentional government action is enough. Most of the
circuits have held that either reckless government action or
deliberate indifference by the government is sufficient.'"
Sacramento v. Lewis'" is important is because it implies that,
apart from emergency situations, deliberate indifference is
sufficient for deprivation.'"
's Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
'5' Id. (further citation quotation omitted) (arguing prison's negligence
"deprived petitioner of his liberty interest in freedom from bodily injury").
'9 474 U.S. 344.
'60 474 U.S. at 345.
161 Id. at 346.
162 id.
'63 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 346; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348 (holding mere
negligence is not enough to trigger the protections of either substantive or
procedural due process).
16' M.B. v. Reish, 119 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (finding inmate's claim "insufficient as a
matter of law," since he failed to show "deliberate indifference" on the part of
prison officials."); Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1997)
(explaining "courts must scrutinize whether prison officials acted or failed to
act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind"); Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d
1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778,
784 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that plaintiff-prisoner must "'show that the
prison official[s] w[ere] deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical
needs.').
'0 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
'6 Id. at 1719.
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The other line of cases in this area is the Parratt v. Taylor6'
line that Professor Schwartz also referred to.' In 1981, the
Supreme Court, in Parratt, held that there is no due process
claim if all a person is seeking is a post-deprivation remedy for
loss of property and the state provides such a remedy.'"
Parratt involved a prisoner in the Nebraska prison system
whose hobby kit got lost.170  He sued and said that the
government's negligence cost him his property without due
process. "I The Supreme Court ruled that negligence was
sufficient for deprivation of due process.'17 The Court later
expressly overruled that aspect of Parratt, Daniels, and
Davidson,17 but the other aspect of the Parratt decision was left
untouched by the Court.
The Supreme Court, in Parratt, noted that the prisoner was
only seeking a post-deprivation remedy for his loss of property."7 '
He wants the twenty-three dollars back. 7s The Supreme Court
held that Nebraska provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy
167 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
169 See Schwartz, supra.
19 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44 (holding the prisoner "has not alleged a
violation of the Due Process Clause").
170 Id. at 529. The prisoner's mail-order hobby kit was valued at $23.50.
Id.
171 Id. (claiming that prisoner's property "was negligently lost by prison
officials in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution," thus depriving him of his "property without due
process of law.").
" Id. at 533-34. The prisoner's claim was brought under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983. Id. at 529. The Court, in discussing the applicable standard for
the statute, noted that there was "[n]othing in the language" of the statute that
would limit it "solely to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights," and
that, since there was no "express requirement of a particular state of mind,"
negligence would suffice. Id. at 533-35.
173 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). See infra notes 184-195
and accompanying text.
174 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 453.
175 Id. at 529.
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and the prisoner could go to Nebraska and get it.' Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded, a person could not say the state
was against due process."'
Immediately, commentators and the lower courts recognized
the potential broad implications of Parratt v. Taylor.7 All of the
Bill of Rights is applied to the states through the due process
clause. 79  In almost all instances, people are seeking post-
deprivation remedies for their loss of rights, Parratt might then
mean that any time there is a claim against a state or local
government for violating anybody's rights, so long as all the
person is seeking is a post-deprivation remedy, there is no federal
constitutional claim, no Section 1983 claim, no due process
claim.
The Supreme Court initially extended Parratt v. Taylor, in
Hudson v. Palmer." The Supreme Court held Parratt applies
not only to the negligent deprivation of property, but the
intentional deprivation of property as well. 8' In Hudson, prison
officials allegedly intentionally destroyed some property of a
176 Id. at 543 (explaining that Nebraska provided the prisoner "with the
means to redress [his] deprivation," since, by utilizing the State's tort claim
procedure, the prisoner could have had his case heard and paid for by the
State, though he chose not to pursue this opportunity).
"7 Id. at 544 (holding that the remedies provided by the State "could have
fully compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered," and thus
they were "sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.").
"7 See Nika Corp. v. City of Kansas City, 582 F. Supp. 343, 360 (W.D.
Mo. 1983) (noting "[t]he decision in Parratt has led to debate in the lower
federal courts, as well as amongst legal scholars, as all concerned attempted to
assess its basic rationale and implication.").
'71 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994), reh'g denied, 510 U.S.
1215 (1994) (further citation omitted) (explaining that "the Court has
concluded that a number of the procedural protections contained in the Bill of
Rights were made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
'go 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (explaining that "[w]hile Parratt is necessarily
limited by its facts to negligent deprivations of property . . . its reasoning
applies as well to intentional deprivations of property.").
181 Id.
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prisoner. 82 The Supreme Court noted that all the prisoner was
seeking was a post-deprivation remedy and that the state provided
one. 3
The key case limiting Parratt v. Taylor is Zinermon v.
Burch." Zinermon v. Burch involved an individual who claimed
that he was wrongly institutionalized, wrongly civilly
committed.' He brought a lawsuit for money damages.',' The
Supreme Court said that Parrat v. Taylor applies only under
limited circumstances. 7
" Id. at 520. The prisoner claimed that a prison officer intentionally
destroyed some of his personal property while looking for contraband during a
"shakedown" search of his prison cell and locker. Id. at 519-20.
1 Id. at 533 (holding "an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property
by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the. . .Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a meaningful post-deprivation
remedy for the loss is available.").
'8 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
18s Id. at 114-15. The respondent, in Zinermon, claimed that employees of
a state hospital "deprived him of his liberty, without due process of law,"
when they admitted him to the hospital as a voluntary mental patient, without
obtaining his informed consent, at a time when he was not competent enough
to give such consent. Id.
196 Id. at 120-22.
'87 Id. at 136. The Court explained that:
[When [state] officials fail to provide constitutionally
required procedural safeguards to a person whom they
deprive of liberty, the state officials cannot then escape
liability by invoking Parratt .... It is immaterial whether
the due process violation [respondent] alleges is best
described as arising from petitioners' failure to comply with
state procedures for admitting involuntary patients, or from
the absence of a specific requirement that petitioners
determine whether a patient is competent to voluntary
admission. [The respondent's] suit is neither an action
challenging the facial adequacy of a State's statutory
procedures, nor an action based only on state officials'
random and unauthorized violation of state laws.
[Respondent] is not simply attempting to blame the State for
misconduct by its employees. He seeks to hold state officials
accountable for their abuse of their broadly delegated,
uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue.
Id. at 136-37.
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First, it applies only if it is a procedural due process claim, not
if it is a substantive due process claim.'" If all the person is
saying is that there are no adequate procedures and the state has
adequate procedures, then Parratt applies. If it is a claim of a
substantive right, Parratt is inapplicable. 89
Second, courts hold that Parratt v. Taylor applies only if there
is a claim that the acts of government officials are random and
unauthorized.'" Parratt does not apply if there is a claim that this
is a policy of the government in general. 9'
Third, Parratt applies only if all the prisoner is seeking is a
post-deprivation remedy.'12 If what the prisoner is saying is that
there was no adequate procedure before the deprivation, then
Parratt is inapplicable.111
Fourth, Parratt applies only in a situation where the state
provides adequate remedies.'" However, the Supreme Court has
never had the occasion to determine what are adequate remedies
for purpose of Parratt.
Zinermon is extremely important in clarifying and limiting
Parratt. However, Justice Kennedy has suggested that Parratt
,s Id. at 137.
189 Id.
'90 Id. at 138. The Court explained that the petitioners conduct was not
"unauthorized" in the same "sense the term [was] used in Parratt and
Hudson," since "[t]he State delegated to them the power and authority to effect
. .. [respondent's] confinement in a mental hospital, and also delegated to
them the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set up by the
state law to guard against unlawful confinement." Id.
191 Id.
'92 Id. at 128. The Zinermon Court explained that "the Parratt rules comes
into play in a due process analysis where post-deprivation "tort remedies are
all the process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the State
could be expected to provide." Id.
193 id.
'94 Id. at 136-37. The Court noted that "[i]n Parratt, the very nature of the
deprivation made predeprivation process 'impossible,'" id. at 137 (quoting
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)), but that in the present case, the
Court was unable to find that predeprivation process was impossible since the
state "already [had] an established procedure for involuntary placement." Id.
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should be revisited and expanded and Zinermon should be
reconsidered.'95
Just a sentence each about the latter two questions. There has
to be a deprivation of life, liberty or property to put an interest
within the meaning of due process clause, but the current Court is
taking a very narrow view.1m And finally, if there is to be a
showing that there is no adequate justification for the
government's action when the government takes away life, liberty
or property, it always must meet at least a rational basis review. 1
5 Id. at 138 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining this opinion
"unnecessarily transforms well established procedural due process doctrine and
departs from controlling precedent," because Parratt and Hudson "should
govern this case.").
19 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997)
(quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, (1992)). In
Glucksberg, the Court explained its general reluctance "to expand the concept
of substantive due process [since] guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended." Id. (citing Harker Heights,
503 U.S. at 125). The Court continued, stating that it is necessary to
"'exercise the utmost care'" when "'break['mg] new ground' in the due process
area,'" id. (quoting Harker Heights, 503 U.S. at 125), "lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy
preferences of the members of this Court." Id. (citing Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
'97 See ERWIN CHE M INSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES &
POLICIES 415 n.3 (1997) (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988); U.S. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Allied Stores v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955), reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1995); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 921 (1952)). In
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Justice Douglas stated that the Oklahoma law in
question "may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases," but "it
is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement." 348 U.S. at 487. See also Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). In Ferguson, Justice Black explained:
Under the system of government created by our
Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on
the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time when
the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike
down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise
or incompatible with some particular economic or social
philosophy . . . . [That doctrine] has long since been
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If a government action is arbitrary or capricious, even if it is not
a fundamental right, the government loses. This is rare,"
though, because under rational basis review, the government
virtually always wins. Therefore, substantive due process has its
most profound impact in instances where the claim is a
fundamental right because then, in order to show an adequate
justification, the government must meet strict scrutiny."9 This is
a quick history of substantive due process and also points to the
future showing, at least with the current Supreme Court,
substantive due process claims are unlikely to prevail.
discarded. It is now settled that States have power to
legislate against what are found to be injurious commercial
and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of
some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or some
valid federal law.
Id. at 729.
'98 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626, 635 (1996) (explaining
that the objective of the Colorado law, to repeal existing laws and "policies of
state and local governments that barred discrimination based on sexual
orientation," bore no "rational relationship to legitimate governmental
purposes.").
'99 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1982); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
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